Reform of the contract system in the sphere of public procurement: illusion of solutions and reality of problems

Abstract

The article analyzes the main development of the current stage of the reform of the public procurement system in the Russian Federation, which began in 2013. It is shown that since the beginning of the reform, the Russian procurement regulation system has made significant progress in terms of standardization and simplification of contractual relations, organization of processes and facilities. The experience of practical implementation of the contracting system is considered, the problems that have developed in the field of public procurement to date are identified. It is shown that the problems of organizing public procurement are not limited to corruption and the desire to give large contracts to “their” suppliers. An unresolved problem remains the need to maintain a balance of interests between ensuring procurement efficiency for the customer and providing contractors with competitive access to the competition for contracts. Unresolved this dilemma often turns budget savings into an end in itself, which reduces the effectiveness of the Russian contract system as a whole. The price and quality of products are different scales, which in modern reality are increasingly leaning towards economy. Hard-toreach and sparsely populated municipalities become especially vulnerable in this struggle. It is shown in the work that the named problems cannot be solved by mere «easing» or «toughening» of the provisions of the law. It is important, while maintaining the foundations of the current system, to focus on finding options that stimulate efficient spending of funds or, at least, prevent the growth of inefficiency in procurement. The conclusion is made about the need for a systematic evolution of the contract system, taking into account regional aspects. To do this, it is advisable to transfer the emphasis in the organization of public procurement from the regulation of the procurement procedures themselves to the formation of incentive (restraint) mechanisms for specific officials involved in the organization of procurement.