Самохин А.В.

The article deals with the reorganization of higher military control of the USSR and the influence on it of external military and political factors.The purpose of this article is to determine the group of military-political factors have caused the changes in the military government that took place in 1950 Scientific novelty of the article is that the author of the first attempt to study the problem of relationships between changes in the military government of the Soviet Army and the factors of military-political confrontation USSR and the USA. Based primarily historical documents, the author concludes that the rapid development of the events of late 1949 - early 1950 caused the beginning of a new round of military-political confrontation between the USSR and the United States forced the Soviet leadership to divide a single Ministry of the Armed Forces for two - Military and Naval . At the same time , establish and highest state authority of the Armed Forces of the USSR – the Supreme Military Council , Council of Ministers , headed by Stalin.

The article deals with the reorganization of the system of higher military control of the Soviet Union in the first two years after the end of the World War II. The author on the basis of the documentary reveals the inside and foreign policy reasons for reforming the armed forces of the USSR. Foreign policy reasons were the beginning of the Cold War. The internal causes are the condition of the entire military machine of the Soviet Union. Transition of the army to the peacetime conditions revealed serious shortcomings in a military training and in a technical equipment. Besides, the emergency controls created during the war did not meet the requirements of peace. At that time, it became necessary to merge the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy in a Commissariat (later the Ministry) of the Armed Forces. Until 1947 it was headed by I.V. Stalin, then by N.A. Bulganin. Such a merger was due to the country's transition to a peaceful period and re-equipment and refurbishment of the Soviet Army with new modern weapons.

The article is devoted to a contentious issue in the historiography of the time development of the first post-war plan to attack England and the United States to the Soviet Union and the reaction to it of I.V. Stalin. The study is based on the published and archival documents. Established in the modern historiography opinion about the terms of development operation «Unthinkable» as well as the actions of the Soviet government, which came out of the opportunity to consult with the plan of operation, are required the revision. The author, in his article argues that the plan «Unthinkable» was not developed by April 1, 1945 as stated earlier, but not before the middle of April – early May. The main event that made Churchill to order the preparation of the plan of the war against the Soviet Union was the success of the Berlin offensive of the Red Army. In addition, the article rightly proved that the movement of Soviet forces in Europe in early June has nothing to do with an introduction to I.V. Stalin's plans for the war against the Soviet Union. They were based on the knowledge of the Soviet leader with the plan, and the messages received by the Supreme Commander of the actions of the former allies. They allowed him to draw a conclusion about the intentions of England and the United States to provoke a possible military conflict against the Soviet Union.

The article covers the question of the USSR participation in the Korean War of 1950 – 1953 which have been appreciated differently by the Soviet historiography. In his article the author makes the conclusion that the Korean War gave military and political advantage to the USSR in any way of development of the events. Additionally, Joseph Stalin either thought that the USA would interfere into the War and it wouldn’t be useless for the Soviet Union. Moreover, the head of the USSR took certain efforts in this direction.

The Article is dedicated to the problem of I. V. Stalin’s attitude to the development of the Chinese revolution, which has got contradictory evaluation in domestic and Chinese historiography. In it the author, on the base of analyses documents, draws a conclusion that the position of the head of the Soviet government in January – April 1949 has suffered a change. From the attempts to persuade the Chinese communists not to be in a hurry with the attacking Homindan troops, Stalin came to the conclusion about the necessity of the quickest army Chan Kayshi army. In fact development of events has caused those differences of opinion in Russian and Chinese historiography.

Статья посвящена малоизученной теме военной помощи Советского Союза Коммунистической партии Китая (далее – КПК) как фактора военно-политического противостояния СССР и США на Дальнем Востоке. В своей статье автор на основе проанализированных документов делает вывод о том, что именно это противостояние оказывало решающее влияние на советско-китайские отношения и военную и военно-техническую помощь со стороны Советского Союза китайским коммунистам.